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This study investigated the role of moral reasoning and moral emotions (i.e., sympathy and
guilt) in the development of young children’s donating behavior (N = 160 4- and 8-year-old
children). Donating was measured through children’s allocation of resources (i.e., stickers)
to needy peers and was framed as a donation to “World Vision.” Children’s sympathy
was measured with both self- and primary caregiver-reports and participants reported
their anticipation of guilt feelings following actions that violated prosocial moral norms,
speciﬁcally the failure to help or share. Participants also provided justiﬁcations for their
anticipated emotions, which were coded as representing moral or non-moral reasoning
processes. Children’s moral reasoning emerged as a signiﬁcant predictor of donating
behavior. In addition, results demonstrated signiﬁcant developmental and gender effects,
with 8-year-olds donating signiﬁcantly more than 4-year-olds and 4-year-old girls making
higher value donations than boys of the same age. We discuss donation behaviors within
the broader context of giving and highlight the moral developmental antecedents of giving
behaviors in childhood.
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INTRODUCTION
Giving is one of the key social behaviors that distinguishes our
species from others (Knafo and Plomin, 2006) and fosters care
and cooperation in social interactions (Staub, 1979). It takes
many forms, from the reciprocal sharing of toys with friends in
preschool, to the anonymous donation of money to a charity,
to our society’s centralized division and allocation of resources as
part of the social welfare system. Because of its roots in early child-
hood and its importance to large-scale fairness and care (Malti
et al., 2012), a rich body of research in psychology has focused
on understanding the development and motivation of children’s
giving behaviors (Eisenberg et al., 2014). It is often the case, how-
ever, that little distinction is drawn between different subtypes
of giving. As a result, a lack of conceptual clarity surrounding
subtypes of giving behavior exists and many questions remain
regarding their potentially distinct affective and cognitive moral
antecedents.
Giving behaviors can be differentiated along multiple dimen-
sions, including anonymity (of either the giver or the recipient),
the recipient’s level of need, the cost of the giving behavior, and
the degree of reciprocity in the relationship between the giver and
the recipient. Sharing, as one type of giving, for example, is often
examined in research using the dictator game (Kahneman et al.,
1986; Gummerum et al., 2010) in which a single player chooses
how many (if any) of a set number of items to allocate to an
anonymous other. Sharing is completed privately and there is no
opportunity for the recipient to respond, retaliate, or form an eval-
uation of the (non)sharer (Gummerum et al., 2010). In this way,
sharing in the dictator game is anonymous, unreciprocated, and
costly (the shared items are typically selected so that they are valu-
able to the giver and there is no opportunity for the allocated items
tobe returned). Researchersmayvary the contextual features of the
dictator game, but in the simplest version, there is no explicit need
ascribed to the recipient. Donating, like sharing, is also typically
anonymous, costly, and unreciprocated. Unlike sharing, however,
givers in donation tasks are confronted with potential recipients
who exhibit clear need, often on the basis of poverty (Dlugokin-
ski and Firestone, 1973; Rushton and Wheelwright, 1980), injury
(Knight et al., 1994), illness (Boe and Ponder, 1981), or disability
(Isen and Noonberg, 1979).
Although a number of studies (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987;
Malti et al., 2012; Ongley and Malti, 2014) have investigated the
relationship between giving behaviors in general and their affective
and cognitive moral antecedents, many questions remain about
the moral antecedents of distinct giving behaviors, such as shar-
ing and donating. In particular, existing developmental studies
have found that the association between giving behaviors and
morality differs on the basis of: (1) the type of giving behavior
considered (and its dimensions of anonymity, cost, reciprocity,
and need of the recipient), (2) the speciﬁc aspect of morality mea-
sured (e.g., moral reasoning vs. moral emotions, self-evaluative
vs. other- oriented moral emotions, and responses to moral
transgressions committed by the self or by others), and (3) the
measures used in assessing children’s giving and their cognitive and
affective moral development (e.g., self-reports, teacher/parent-
ratings, anonymous vs. public giving). In the current study, we
therefore consider an important distinction between the giving
behaviors of sharing and donating: the absence or presence of
explicit need. We also investigate the developmental trajectory
and affective-moral antecedents speciﬁc to donation behaviors of
4- and 8-year-olds. We then discuss our ﬁndings on children’s
donating in light of previous, related work on sharing, comparing
www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 458 | 1
Ongley et al. Giving, moral reasoning, and moral emotions
the motivational factors that may be at play in these two distinct
types of giving.
In the current study, we chose to examine sympathy, guilt,
and moral reasoning as potential motivators of young children’s
donation behaviors. Each of these processes has been highlighted
in the existing developmental literature as playing an important
role in the development of morally relevant, prosocial behavior.
The affective experience of sympathy stems from the apprehen-
sion of another’s emotional state and arouses feelings of concern
for others (Eisenberg, 2000). A rich body of research has demon-
strated that the experience of sympathy may serve to motivate
prosocial, other-oriented behavior through concern for others’
wellbeing and the desire to reduce others’ distress (see Eisen-
berg et al., 2014). Existing research also suggests that the affective
experience of sympathy early in childhood may lead to a general
tendency to consider the needs of others and the development of
norms of fairness and care (Malti et al., 2007, 2012; Knafo et al.,
2008; Ongley and Malti, 2014).
In addition to sympathy, the moral emotion of guilt has also
been identiﬁed as a key affective process in children’s prosocial
moral development (Hoffman,2000;Malti andLatzko,2012;Malti
and Ongley, 2014). While sympathy is considered to be an other-
oriented emotion, guilt is oriented towards the self and towards
one’s own actions in relation to moral norms (Malti and Ong-
ley, 2014). Guilt has been deﬁned as a painful feeling of regret
over wrongdoing (Ferguson and Stegge, 1998) and arises when
one acts in violation of one’s ownmoral standards (Tangney et al.,
2007). The experience of guilt feelings reﬂects the awareness that
one has transgressed his or her own internalized moral rules and
takes responsibility for these actions (Malti and Ongley, 2014).
When one anticipates that feelings of guilt will accompany poten-
tial moral rule violations, such as the failure to help or give to
those in need, this anticipation of (and desire to avoid) future
guilt encourages a commitment to live up to internalized moral
standards (Ferguson and Stegge, 1998; Hoffman, 2000; Carlo et al.,
2012; Ongley and Malti, 2014). Existing research has suggested
that children’s anticipation of guilt is positively related to actions
that are consistent with prosocial moral norms such as helping
those in need and sharing fairly with others (Chapman et al., 1987;
Gummerum et al., 2010; Ongley and Malti, 2014).
The use of moral reasoning to justify actions or resolve moral
dilemmas, as compared to reasoning based on sanctions, hedo-
nistic or self-serving considerations, has also been demonstrated
to predict speciﬁc types of prosocial responding in children, such
as sharing, helping, and cooperation (Larrieu and Mussen, 1986;
Miller et al., 1996; Stewart and McBride-Chang, 2000; Hinnant
et al., 2013). Together, moral reasoning and moral emotions, such
as sympathy and guilt, have been theorized to play an important
role in the early development of moral action tendencies and the
consideration of others’ welfare (Hoffman, 2000; Arsenio, 2014;
Malti and Ongley, 2014).
In light of the theoretical perspectives outlined above and spe-
ciﬁc ﬁndings relevant to giving behavior, we made a series of
hypotheses regarding the potential associations between children’s
donating behavior and sympathy, guilt, and moral reasoning.
Based on ﬁndings from previous studies showing that sympathy
predicts donating in middle childhood (Knight et al., 1994) and
other forms of giving (i.e., sharing) in early childhood (Ongley
andMalti, 2014), we hypothesized that sympathy would emerge as
a signiﬁcant predictor of donating across our two age groups. We
also expected that the anticipation of moral guilt would be posi-
tively associated with donating. This hypothesis was drawn from
related research demonstrating a positive relationship between
guilt and overt prosocial behavior (Malti and Krettenauer, 2013)
and between guilt and other forms of giving (i.e., sharing) in
young children (Gummerum et al., 2010; Ongley andMalti, 2014).
Finally, we predicted that moral reasoning would also emerge as
a signiﬁcant predictor of donating in early childhood. Though
existing research has yielded conﬂicting ﬁndings as to the role of
moral reasoning in various forms of giving in childhood, there
is existing evidence to suggest that moral reasoning is positively
associated with donating inmiddle childhood (Knight et al., 1994)
and with costly giving behaviors (i.e., sharing) in early child-
hood (Eisenberg-Berg and Hand, 1979; Eisenberg et al., 1985; see
however, Gummerum et al., 2008).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The participants in the current study were a community sample
of 160 children and their primary caregivers from a suburban area
of a major Canadian city. Participants were 78 4-year-olds [M
age = 4.44 years, SD = 0.27; 38 girls (49%)] and 82 8-year-olds
[M age = 8.49, SD = 0.24, 43 girls (52%)]. Participating chil-
dren and their primary caregivers were ﬂuent in English and the
majority of primary caregivers were mothers (79%). As a proxy
for socioeconomic status (SES), we asked primary caregivers to
report their highest level of education. Fifty-ﬁve percent of pri-
mary caregivers reported that they had completed a university
degree, followed in frequency by the completion of a college degree
(23%), graduate degree (14%), and high school diploma (8%).
As compared to data from the 2006 Census (Statistics Canada,
2007), the education of participants’ primary caregivers is repre-
sentative of the general education level in the city from which our
sample was drawn. The sample for the current study was ethni-
cally diverse. Ethnic backgrounds reported by primary caregivers
include Western European (34%), South Asian (14%), Eastern
European (11%), EastAsian (4%),Caribbean (3%),West andCen-
tral Asian (3%), Southeast Asian (3%), African (3%), Central and
South American (3%), and other/multiple origins (18%). Four
percent of the primary caregivers chose not to report their ethnic
background.
PROCEDURE
Children and their primary caregivers visited the research labora-
tory once. At the onset of the session, primary caregivers provided
written informed consent for their child’s participation and chil-
dren provided informed verbal consent. Each child was tested
independently in a separate room while his or her primary care-
giver ﬁlled out a questionnaire on the child’s moral and social
development and family demographic information. Each session
lasted approximately 45 min and consisted of interview questions
on moral and social development, nine variations of the dicta-
tor game, and a donation task. All sessions were recorded on
video. The testers were undergraduate psychology students who
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had been extensively trained in interview techniques. As pilot test-
ing did not indicate order effects, tasks were administered in a
ﬁxed order, with the measurement of self-reported sympathy fol-
lowing themeasurement of guilt feelings,moral reasoning, and the
dictator game (though the latter is not discussed as part of the cur-
rent study). The donation task was the ﬁnal task in the study. All
procedures conformed to APA ethical standards for research with
children and were approved by the university’s Research Ethics
Board.
MEASURES
Donating
Donating was measured through children’s allocation of resources
(i.e., stickers) to needy peers and was framed as a donation to
“World Vision.” The donation task was adapted from those used
in previous research (see Knight et al., 1994). In a task conducted
earlier in the experiment as part of a larger study, children par-
ticipated in nine variations of the dictator game in which they
received stickers from the experimenter and decided whether or
not to share any number of these with a hypothetical peer. These
sharing tasks were conducted privately and with no feedback from
the experimenter. For the donation task itself, participants were
then left with a number of stickers (ranging from0 to 54, described
below) and they were told that the experimenter was “collect-
ing stickers for poor children.” The experimenter showed the
participant a donation box upon which was displayed a World
Vision poster composed of the World Vision logo, motto (i.e.,
“Lend a hand”), and a photograph of three sad and economically
disadvantaged children. Participants were then told that poor chil-
dren would be happy to receive stickers and they were invited to
donate any number of stickers they wished. The experimenter
clearly stated the participants’ ownership of the stickers and their
option to not donate (i.e., “You don’t have to give away any of
your stickers if you don’t want to. These are your stickers”). To
allow for ostensibly anonymous donations, the experimenter left
the room.
The donation measure was scored as the proportion of stick-
ers in each child’s possession at the start of the donation task
that was placed in the donation box. Although all participants
received the same number of stickers in the dictator game (all
participants received 54 stickers in total over 9 variations of the
dictator game), participants shared varying proportions of these
with hypothetical recipients. Therefore, at the start of the dona-
tion task, the number of stickers in participants’ possession ranged
from 0 to 54 (see Table 1, which displays descriptive statistics by
age group for the number of stickers children possessed at the start
of the donation task and the proportion of stickers donated). To
ensure that children’s donating was not inﬂuenced by the num-
ber of stickers in their possession at the start of the donation
task, we tested the correlation between the number of stickers
possessed and the proportion of these stickers donated to World
Vision, r(157) = −0.34, p < 0.001. This resulting negative associ-
ation indicates that children with fewer stickers in their possession
were not inﬂuenced away from donating by their relatively small
amount of stickers, but instead donated more than their “richer”
peers. It is important to note that this negative association between
the number of stickers possessed and the proportion of stickers
donated is what would be expected, given that the children with
fewer stickers in their possession were those who shared more
in earlier tasks. To further ensure that there were no system-
atic associations between the number of stickers in participants’
possession at the start of the donation task and other key vari-
ables in the study, we tested for potential correlations between
the number of stickers possessed and each of the key study vari-
ables (i.e., moral reasoning, child-reported sympathy, caregiver-
reported sympathy, and guilt). No signiﬁcant correlations
emerged.
Sympathy
Children’s sympathy was measured using children’s self-reports
and ratings by primary caregivers.
Self-reported sympathy. Children’s self-reported sympathy was
measured with ﬁve items from Zhou et al.’s (2003) child-report
sympathy scale, which is used widely in research with children
(see, for example, Malti et al., 2009; Catherine and Schonert-
Reichl, 2011; Ongley and Malti, 2014). A sixth reverse-coded
item from Zhou et al.’s (2003) child-report sympathy scale was
included in testing (“I don’t feel sorry for other children who
are being teased or picked on”), but was excluded from analy-
ses due to low reliability. Participants heard each statement read
aloud (e.g., “I often feel sorry for other children who are sad
or in trouble”) and after each was asked whether the sentence
describes him/her or not, and if so, how strongly. Participants
were asked to answer spontaneously and not think too long about
their answers. Responses were scored as follows: this is not like
me was scored as 0, this is sort of like me was scored as 1, and
this is really like me was scored as 2. Cronbach’s α for the child-
reported sympathy scale was.69 for 4-year-olds and.68 for 8-year-
olds.
Caregiver-reported sympathy. Primary caregiver-reports of their
child’s sympathy were obtained using all ﬁve items from Zhou
et al.’s (2003) parent-report sympathy scale (e.g., “My child gets
Table 1 | Descriptive statistics by age group for number of stickers children possessed at start of donation task and proportion of stickers
donated.
Age group Number of stickers in possession Proportion of stickers donated
Minimum Maximum M (SD) Minimum Maximum M (SD)
4-Year-Olds 0 54 31.68 (14.59) 0 1.00 0.27 (0.32)
8-Year-Olds 12 48 28.49 (7.00) 0 1.00 0.53 (0.28)
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upset when he/she sees another child being hurt”). Primary care-
givers responded to the ﬁve statements as part of the questionnaire
package. Responses were scored as follows: not at all true was
scored as 1, often not true was scored as 2, somewhat not true was
scored as 3, somewhat true was scored as 4, often true was scored as
5, and always true was scored as 6. Cronbach’s α for the caregiver-
reported sympathy scale was. 0.85 and. 0.89 as reported for 4- and
8-year-old children, respectively.
Guilt feelings and moral reasoning
To measure children’s anticipation of guilt feelings and moral rea-
soning (i.e., justiﬁcations for anticipated emotions that refer to
moral norms or empathic concern for the victim), participants
listened and responded to two vignettes depicting moral rule
violations (Malti, 2011). The vignettes were adapted from those
used in previous research examining the development of moral
emotions in the happy-victimizer paradigm (seeMalti and Krette-
nauer, 2013; Arsenio, 2014). Both vignettes represented a situation
in which a child has failed to perform a prosocial action, speciﬁ-
cally helping or sharing. The two vignettes were read aloud with
accompanying illustrations as follows: (1) “Toby’s mom makes
two cupcakes, one for Toby, and one for Kevin. Toby decides to
eat the two cupcakes and give none to Kevin”; and (2) “One of
the boys in Luke’s class was sick when the rest of the class learned
a new song that all the students must learn. The boy asks Luke
if he could teach him the song but Luke says ‘no’.” The gender
of the characters in each vignette was matched to that of the
participant and the wording of the vignettes was slightly mod-
iﬁed to be appropriate for each age group. After hearing both
vignettes, participants were asked to describe how they would
feel if they had performed the action in the vignette (i.e., moral
emotion) and why they would feel this way (i.e., moral reason-
ing). These verbal responses were transcribed verbatim by the
experimenter. This procedure is consistent with previous research
using the happy-victimizer paradigm (Malti et al., 2009; Arsenio,
2014).
Coding for guilt. Participants’ ﬁrst spontaneously mentioned
emotion in response to each vignette was coded as anger, fear,
sadness, happiness, pride, guilt, disgust, anxiety/worry, embar-
rassment/shame, neutral, feeling good, feeling bad, describing a
psychosomatic complaint, or other. The anticipation of feeling
guilty, sad, or bad was coded as representing the anticipation
of guilt (see Malti et al., 2009). Other immoral or amoral nega-
tive emotions (e.g., anger, fear, or disgust), along with positive
emotions and neutral states were coded as not representing guilt.
This coding system was based on those used previously in related
research (e.g.,Malti et al., 2009) and it includes the basic emotional
correlates of guilt so that guilt expectancies can be examined in
young children who may not be able to explicitly label complex
emotions (i.e., guilt) but can already name their basic emotional
correlates (Tracy et al., 2005; Malti and Ongley, 2014; Ongley and
Malti, 2014). Inter-rater reliability for the coding of guilt was
κ = 0.99 based on 15% of the data.
Proportional scores for guilt were created by aggregating the
scores from the two vignettes: 0 = no anticipation of guilt in
response to either vignette, 0.50= anticipation of guilt in response
to one of the two vignettes, and 1.00 = anticipation of guilt in
response to both vignettes. The aggregation of scores was justiﬁed
as there was a signiﬁcant association between the guilt scores for
the two vignettes, r(146) =0.24, p = 0.004.
Coding for moral reasoning. Participants’ justiﬁcations for their
anticipated emotions were coded as either moral reasons (i.e.,
those which refer to moral norms and empathic concern for the
victim, such as “It is not fair to steal” or “The other child will be
sad”) or non-moral reasons (i.e., those which refer to sanctions by
an authority, such as “The teacher might ﬁnd out and get angry,”
hedonistic or self-serving reasons, such as “I just like cupcakes
so much,” unelaborated reasons, such as “It isn’t nice”), or other,
unclassiﬁable reasons.
Proportional scores for moral reasoning were created by aggre-
gating the scores from the two vignettes: 0 = moral reasoning
was not used to justify emotions in response to either vignette,
0.50 = moral reasoning was used to justify emotions in response
to one of the two vignettes, and 1.00=moral reasoningwas used to
justify emotions in response to both vignettes. The aggregation of
scores was justiﬁed as there was a signiﬁcant association between
the moral reasoning scores for the two vignettes, r(128) = 0.27,
p = 0.002.
RESULTS
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations of the study
variables by age group and gender.
Table 3 displays the correlations between study variables and
between study and control variables (i.e., child age, gender, and
primary caregiver’s level of education). As can be seen, donating
was positively correlatedwith child-reported sympathy,moral rea-
soning, and child age. Donatingwas also negatively correlatedwith
child gender (gender was dummy coded, girls = 0, boys = 1), with
girls donatingmore than boys. In addition, child-reported sympa-
thy was positively correlated with moral reasoning, child age, and
primary caregiver’s level of education. Caregiver-reported sym-
pathy was negatively correlated with primary caregiver’s level of
education and children’s use of moral reasoning was positively
correlated with their age.
Age and gender differences were also analyzed for each of the
central study variables. First, four 2 (age group) × 2 (gender)
between-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted
to examine age and gender differences in moral reasoning and
in each of the emotion variables. Means and standard deviations
of moral reasoning, child-reported sympathy, caregiver-reported
sympathy, and guilt for boys and girls within each age group are
reported in Table 2, as are signiﬁcant gender differences within
each age group and age effects for boys and girls. Next, differ-
ences in donating across age groups and gender were examined
using a 2 (age group) × 2 (gender) between-subjects ANOVA.
Main effects of both age group and gender were found for chil-
dren’s donating behavior, F(1,153) = 28.82, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.16
and F(1,153) = 5.59, p = 0.019, η2p = 0.04, respectively, with 8-
year-olds donatingmore than 4-year-olds and girls donatingmore
than boys (Table 2). Although there was only a marginally signif-
icant interaction between age group and gender, F(1,153) = 3.66,
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Table 2 | Means and standard deviations of study variables by age group and gender.
Variable 4-Year-olds (n = 78) 8-Year-olds (n = 82)
Girls M (SD) Boys M (SD) Girls M (SD) Boys M (SD)
Donating 0.37 (0.34)*,a 0.17 (0.27)*,A 0.54 (0.26)b 0.52 (0.31)B
Child-reported sympathy 0.59 (0.52)a 0.63 (0.51)A 1.52 (0.42)*,b 1.21 (0.48)*,B
Caregiver-reported sympathy 4.49 (0.77)a 4.59 (0.85)A 5.05 (0.50)*,b 4.53 (1.04)*,A
Guilt 0.61 (0.44)a 0.62 (0.38)A 0.64 (0.37)a 0.56 (0.40)A
Moral reasoning 0.03 (0.13)a 0.00 (0.00)A 0.26 (0.33)b 0.17 (0.31)B
*Asterisks indicate signiﬁcant gender differences (p < 0.05) within age group.
a,bDifferent lower case letter superscripts indicate signiﬁcant age differences (p < 0.05) for girls. A,BDifferent upper case letter superscripts indicate signiﬁcant age
differences (p < 0.05) for boys.
Table 3 | Correlation matrix of study and control variables.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Donating –
2. Child-reported sympathy 0.30*** –
3. Caregiver-reported sympathy 0.10 0.12 –
4. Guilt 0.14† 0.04 −0.05 –
5. Moral reasoning 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.04 0.10 –
6. Child age 0.39*** 0.62*** 0.15† 0.00 0.36*** –
7. Child gender −0.18* −0.14† −0.14† −0.04 −0.14 −0.03 –
8. Primary caregiver’s level of education 0.12 0.18* −0.18* −0.04 0.05 0.12 0.12
Child age is measured in years. Child gender is dummy-coded (girls = 0, boys = 1).
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
p = 0.058, η2p = 0.02, tests of simple effects indicate that gen-
der differences in donating are signiﬁcant for 4-year-olds only
(Table 2).
PREDICTION OF DONATING BEHAVIOR BY SYMPATHY, GUILT,
AND MORAL REASONING
To test our hypotheses regarding the predictive effects of sympa-
thy, guilt, andmoral reasoning ondonating, a hierarchicalmultiple
regression analysis was performed using donation as the depen-
dent variable. As previous research has found associations between
giving behavior and age (Benenson et al., 2007; Malti et al., 2012;
Ongley and Malti, 2014), gender (Benenson et al., 2007; Leman
et al., 2009), and SES (Carlo et al., 2011), we entered child’s age
group, gender, and primary caregiver’s level of education as con-
trol variables in step 1 of the regression model. Child-reported
sympathy, caregiver-reported sympathy, guilt, and moral reason-
ing were entered in step 2, and interaction terms between all
control variables, study variables, and between control and study
variables were entered in step 3. All predictor variables were cen-
tered at the mean, with the exception of gender and age group.
Interaction terms were created by calculating the products of the
mean-centered variables (Aiken and West, 1991). In preliminary
analyses, we tested all possible interactions but non-signiﬁcant
interaction terms were not retained in the ﬁnal model. The ﬁnal
model was examined for multicollinearity using the tolerance
statistic. Tolerance values for the regression model ranged from
0.40 to 0.98, safely exceeding 0.20, the guideline described by
Menard (1995) as the point below which multicollinearity may
be biasing a model.
Table 4 displays the results of the ﬁnal analysis. Results indi-
cated that donating behavior was predicted by child’s age, moral
reasoning, and an interaction between child-reported sympathy
and gender,R2 = 0.26, F(8,129)= 5.72, p < 0.001. R2 of 0.26 indi-
cates a large effect size (Cohen, 1988). Thus, older children and
children more frequently using moral reasoning donated more.
To interpret the interaction between child-reported sympathy and
gender, we used the procedure recommended by Aiken and West
(1991) and the worksheet created by Dawson (n.d.) for plot-
ting interactions between an unstandardized variable and a binary
moderator. We performed t tests on two simple slopes, which rep-
resented the regression of donating on child-reported sympathy
for boys and girls, to determine if they differed signiﬁcantly from
zero. For both genders, simple slopes were evaluated at low and
high levels of sympathy. The low and high values of sympathy
correspond to the response anchors from Zhou et al.’s (2003)
child-report sympathy scale. Amean sympathy score (participant’s
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Table 4 | Hierarchical multiple regression analyses predicting
children’s donating behavior.
Predictor R2/F 2 β
Step 1 0.17/8.98***
Age group 0.35***
Gender −0.15†
Primary caregiver’s level of education 0.10
Step 2 0.07/2.75*
Age group 0.27**
Gender −0.11
Primary caregiver’s level of education 0.12
Child-reported sympathy 0.00
Caregiver-reported sympathy 0.08
Guilt 0.13†
Moral reasoning 0.21*
Step 3 0.03/5.14*
Age group 0.29**
Gender −0.11
Primary caregiver’s level of education 0.09
Child-reported sympathy −0.15
Caregiver-reported sympathy 0.11
Guilt 0.14†
Moral reasoning 0.20*
Child-reported sympathy x gender 0.23*
Total R2 0.26***
N 138
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
average score across 5 items) of 0 indicates weak or no identiﬁca-
tion with sympathetic statements (“this does not sound like me”)
andamean sympathy score of 2 indicates strong identiﬁcationwith
sympathetic statements (“this is really like me”). Neither simple
slope was signiﬁcantly different from zero, with gradients of −0.08
and 0.11, ns, and ns, for girls and boys, respectively. The simple
slopes for girls and boys, were, however, signiﬁcantly different
from each other, with higher levels of sympathy trending towards
a slight increase in donation for boys, while no such increase in
donation occurred with higher levels of sympathy in girls.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated the development of donating, a
speciﬁc subtype of giving, in early and middle childhood, as well
as the role of affective-moral and cognitive-moral variables as
antecedents of donationbehaviors. The act of giving can takemany
forms and previous research has left many questions unanswered
regarding the distinctions between subtypes of giving and their
moral antecedents in childhood. We believe that it is important
to consider whether the factors that motivate children to donate
to needy strangers are the same factors that motivate children to
share with their peers, and if not, what affective and cognitive
processes are important in each. By examining different subtypes
of giving,we can enrichourunderstandingof the factors thatmoti-
vate children to give in different contexts and this understanding
can, in turn, enable researchers, parents, and educators to bet-
ter understand, foster, and diversify young children’s emerging
prosociality.
To test our hypotheses regarding the role of affective-moral
and cognitive-moral antecedents of donation behaviors in early
and middle childhood, we tested the predictive effects of sym-
pathy, guilt, and moral reasoning on donating. We found that
donating was predicted by children’s age, moral reasoning, and an
interaction between gender and child-reported sympathy. Exist-
ing research on sharing has found that the moral emotions of
sympathy and guilt are important motivators of sharing behavior
(Gummerum et al., 2010; Malti et al., 2012; Ongley and Malti,
2014). Interestingly, in the present examination of donation
behaviors, we did not ﬁnd that moral emotions played a cen-
tral role (although guilt was a marginally signiﬁcant predictor).
Although child-reported sympathy was associated with donating
at the bivariate level, it did not emerge as a strong predictor of
donating when other morally relevant processes (i.e., guilt and
moral reasoning) were controlled for. In this case,moral reasoning
emerged as a stronger predictor of children’s donating than either
sympathy or guilt. This contrast between the current ﬁndings on
donating and previous studies on sharing suggests that different
moral-developmental antecedents may vary in the strength with
which they motivate different types of giving. More speciﬁcally,
the present ﬁndings suggest that children’s donation behaviors
may be more strongly related to the cognitive process of reasoning
about others’ needs while deciding to donate than to the donator’s
tendency to experience sympathy and guilt.
Although both donating and sharing behaviors are anonymous,
costly, and unreciprocated forms of giving, they differ in the level
of need demonstrated by the recipient. In particular, the recipi-
ents of donations typically demonstrate clear, explicit need. The
ﬁndings of the present study suggest that this clear need on the
part of donation recipients may be a key factor in this speciﬁc
type of prosocial behavior. In previous work, researchers have
argued that sharing is motivated by moral emotional processes
through the affective comprehension of and concern for others’
emotional states (i.e., sympathy) or through the anticipation of
one’s own negative affective state after the violation of a moral
norm (i.e., guilt; Gummerum et al., 2010;Malti et al., 2012; Ongley
and Malti, 2014). Taken together, these results support the impor-
tance of moral emotions in children’s development of sharing
behaviors. It may be the case that moral reasoning is less impor-
tant in the motivation of sharing than moral emotions because
there is no clear moral imperative to share with those who are not
in need. Our results show that in donation behaviors, however,
children’s giving is also likely to depend upon a cognitive process
in which one attends to and appreciates speciﬁc characteristics of
the recipient (i.e., explicit need) and the consequences of a deci-
sion not to donate. Therefore, higher levels of moral reasoning
may produce an increased tendency to donate because children
realize that it is their duty towards individuals in need. This mech-
anism could lead to the important role of moral reasoning in the
motivation of donation behaviors, although being sympathetic
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with a recipient and feelings of guilt upon the transgression of a
moral norm maintain relevance in children’s orientation towards
others. Nevertheless, other, related interpretations of the current
results could consider additional inter-individual differences and
their potential role in predicting children’s donation behaviors,
such as the role of personality, temperament, the level of children’s
knowledge and consideration of conventions and social norms in
general, and their theory of mind.
In addition to our main ﬁndings, we found developmental
and gender differences in moral reasoning, moral emotions, and
donating. Gender differences in the current study suggest that
school-aged girls report higher levels of sympathy than boys of the
same age and caregivers report age-related increases in sympathy
for girls only. Higher levels of donating were found in school-aged
than in preschool-aged children, and, amongst preschoolers, girls
donated more than boys. We also found that both sympathy and
moral reasoning increased with age, which is consistent with pre-
vious research (for reviews, see Eisenberg et al., 2014; Malti and
Ongley, 2014). Although existing studies have yielded conﬂicting
ﬁndings regarding young children’s ability to provide moral rea-
sons for speciﬁc actions and decisions, the age-related increases in
moral reasoning found in the current study support the idea that
complexmoral reasoning only emerges once children have learned
to integrate the often conﬂicting perspectives of the self and others
and have acquired interpretative understanding (Malti et al., 2010;
Sokol et al., 2010).
The current study has several limitations. Firstly, we used a
cross-sectional design,whichdoes not allow for the examinationof
intra-individual differences and associations between moral rea-
soning, moral emotions, and donating across time. Therefore,
we recognize that our data are correlational in nature and pre-
vent us from being able to interpret results in terms of causal
effects. Future studies on the development of giving behaviors
and their cognitive and affective moral antecedents across time
would beneﬁt from longitudinal designs. Secondly, although the
sample for this study was ethnically diverse and representative of
the general socio-economic status of the city fromwhich our sam-
ple was recruited, participants’ families were largely from mid-
to high-levels of socio-economic status. Thus, ﬁndings from the
current study cannot be generalized to less advantaged children.
As donating involves the recognition of a recipient’s need, less
advantaged children may be more likely to empathize with the
recipient and their pattern of donations may differ from those of
more advantaged children. Future work should include a broad
sample of children that represents more diverse levels of socio-
economic status. The current study also relied upon responses
to a short set of hypothetical scenarios to measure guilt and
moral reasoning. Future research would beneﬁt from the use
of multiple methods of assessing moral emotions and reason-
ing, including children’s responses to their own experiencedmoral
conﬂicts, and a more extensive set of scenarios. As multiple vari-
ables that were not investigated in this study have been found to
be associated with children’s global prosocial behavior, such as
theory of mind, inhibitory control, and peer acceptance/rejection
(Kochanska et al., 1997; Caputi et al., 2012), they may play also
role in children’s donation behaviors. Future work should seek to
address this issue by adding measures of children’s socio-cognitive
ability (e.g., theory of mind tasks), temperament (e.g., inhibition),
and knowledge about (and consideration of) social norms in gen-
eral to investigations of children’s giving. Finally, two marginal
effects in the current study (i.e., the prediction of donation behav-
ior by guilt and the prediction of boys’ donations by self-reported
sympathy) suggest that future studies with a larger sample, and
thus greater predictive power, may help to clarify the role of moral
emotions in donation behaviors.
Despite these limitations, the present study has several notable
strengths. Most importantly, this study investigated a relatively
unexplored issue – the differentiation between speciﬁc types of
giving behaviors and their moral-developmental antecedents in
childhood. The current study explored this issue in an ethnically
diverse sample across two different age groups and demonstrated
that children’s donating is motivated by developmental and cogni-
tivemoral processes, speciﬁcally, children’s use of moral reasoning.
These results differ fromprevious work on sharing, which suggests
that sharing is strongly motivated by affective-moral processes
such as the moral emotions of sympathy and guilt. As a result,
the present study provides valuable contributions to our knowl-
edge about the development of children’s giving behaviors and
why children are motivated to give costly resources to others.
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